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To Radio Day. Communication - the nerves of war

Communication is always a sacred cause,
But in battle it is even more important ...

Today, May 7, is the day of Radio and Communications. This is more than a professional holiday - it is a whole philosophy of continuity, pride in one of the most important inventions of mankind, which has penetrated into all spheres of life and is unlikely to become obsolete in the near future. And two days later, on May 9, there will be 75 years of victory in the Great Patriotic War. In a war in which communications played a huge, and sometimes key, role. Signalers connected divisions, battalions, and fronts, sometimes literally at the cost of their lives, becoming part of a system that made it possible to transmit orders or information. It was a real daily feat throughout the war. In Russia, the day of the military signalman was established; it is celebrated on October 20. But I know for sure that it is celebrated today, on the day of Radio. Therefore, let us recall the equipment and communication technologies of the Great Patriotic War, because it’s not without reason that they saythat communication is the nerves of war. These nerves were at the limit of their capabilities and even above them.


Signalers of the Red Army in 1941 with a coil and field telephone

Field phones


By the beginning of World War II, wired communications had ceased to be the prerogative of the telegraph, telephone lines were developing in the USSR, and the first methods of communication using radio frequencies appeared. But at first it was the wired connection that was the main nerve: telephones made it possible to establish communication in a clean field, forest, through rivers, without requiring any infrastructure. Plus, the signal from the wired telephone could not be intercepted or detected without physical access.

The troops of the Wehrmacht did not doze off: they actively searched for field communication lines and poles, bombed them and arranged sabotage. There were even special shells to attack communication centers, which, when bombed, hooked wires and torn the entire network to shreds. 

The first war with our soldiers was met by a simple field telephone UNA-F-31, one of those that needed copper wires to provide communications. However, it was the wired connection that was distinguished in the war by stability and reliability. To use the phone, it was enough to drag the cable and connect it to the device itself. But to listen to such a phone was difficult: you had to connect directly to the cable, which was guarded (as a rule, the signalmen walked in two or even a small group). But it sounds so simple "in the civilian world." During the fighting, signalmen risked their lives and pulled wires under fire from the enemy, at night, along the bottom of a reservoir, etc. In addition, the enemy carefully monitored the actions of the Soviet signalmen and, as soon as possible, destroyed precisely communications equipment and cables. The heroism of the signalmen knew no bounds:they plunged into the icy water of Ladoga and walked under bullets, they crossed the front line and helped reconnaissance. In documentary sources, there are many cases where a signalman pressed his torn cable with his teeth before his death, so that the last cramp became the missing link for communication.  


UNA-F-31

UNA-F (phonic) and UNA-I (induction) were produced in the city of Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) at the Lenin radiotelephone plant , starting in 1928. They were a simple device in a wooden frame with a belt, consisting of a handset, transformer, capacitor, lightning rod, battery (or power terminals). An induction telephone made a call with a bell, and a phonic telephone with an electric buzzer. The UNA-F model was so quiet that the telephone operator was forced to hold the phone near his ear on duty (by 1943 a convenient headphone had been designed). By 1943, a new modification of the UNA-FI appeared - these phones had an increased range and could be included in any type of switch - phonic, inductor and phono-inductance.


UNA-I-43 field telephones with induction calling were intended for organizing internal telephone communications at headquarters and at command posts of military units and units. In addition, induction apparatuses were used for telephone communications of large military headquarters with lower headquarters. Such communication was carried out mainly on a two-wire constant line, along which the telegraph apparatus worked simultaneously. Inductor apparatuses have become more widespread and widely used due to the convenience of switching and increased reliability.


UNA-FI-43 - field telephone

 The UNA series was replaced by TAI-43 telephones with inductor calling, designed on the basis of a detailed study of captured German field telephones FF-33. The communication range via field cable was up to 25 km, along a constant 3 mm overhead line - 250 km. TAI-43 gave a stable connection and was twice as light as its previous counterparts. Such a telephone was used to provide communication in a link from a division and higher. 


TAI-43

No less remarkable was the PF-1 field telephone set (Helping the Front) of the platoon - company - battalion level, which “defeated” only 18 km through the field cable. The production of devices began in 1941 in the workshops of MGTS (Moscow City Telephone Network). In total, about 3,000 devices were produced. This party, even by our standards, seems small, turned out to be a really big help to the front, where each means of communication was counted and in price.


Communication center in Stalingrad

There was another telephone with an unusual history - IIA-44, which, as the name implies, appeared in the army in 1944. In a metal case, with two capsules, with neat inscriptions and instructions, he was somewhat different from his wooden counterparts and looked more like a trophy. But no, IIA-44 was manufactured by Connecticut Telephone & Electric, an American company, and delivered to the USSR under Lend-Lease. It had an inductor type of call and allowed you to connect an additional handset. In addition, unlike some Soviet models, it had an internal rather than an external battery (the so-called MB class, with a local battery). The battery capacity from the manufacturer was 8 ampere-hours, but the phone had slots for Soviet batteries from 30 ampere-hours. However, military signalmen spoke with restraint about the quality of the equipment.


IIA-44

No less important elements of the military communications system were cables (coils) and switches. 

Field cables, usually 500 m long, were wound onto coils that were attached to the shoulder and were quite conveniently unwound and wound. The main “nerves” of the Great Patriotic War were the field telegraph cable PTG-19 (communication range 40-55 km) and PTF-7 (communication range 15-25 km). Since the beginning of World War II, communications troops annually repaired 40,000–50,000 km of telephone and telegraph lines with up to 200,000 km of wires suspended on them and replaced up to 10,000 posts. The enemy was ready for anything to destroy the communication system, so the restoration was permanent and immediate. The cable had to be laid over any terrain, including the bottom of water bodies - in this case, special sinkers drowned the cable and did not allow it to float to the surface.The most difficult work on laying and repairing a telephone cable took place during the blockade of Leningrad: the city could not be left without communication, and saboteurs did their job, so sometimes divers worked underwater even in the fierce winter. By the way, in the same way, with great difficulties, they laid an electric cable to supply Leningrad with electricity. 


The wires (cable) were subject to both ground attacks and artillery raids - the wire was cut in pieces at several places and the signalman was forced to go search and fix all the cliffs. Communication had to be restored almost instantly, to coordinate further actions of the troops, so the signalmen often made their way under bullets and shells. There were times when the wire was to be pulled through the minefield and the signalmen, without waiting for the sappers, themselves cleared the way for themselves and their wires. The fighters had their own attack, the signalmen had their own, no less nightmarish and deadly. 

In addition to direct threats in the form of enemy weapons, the signalmen had another danger worse than death: since the signalman sitting on the phone knew the whole situation at the front, he was an important target of German intelligence. The signalmen were often captured, because it was quite easy to get close to them: it was enough to cut the wire and wait in ambush when the signalman came to his place in search of another cliff. A little later, methods of protecting and circumventing such maneuvers appeared, fights for information went on the air, but at the beginning of the war the situation was terrible.

Single and paired switches were used to connect telephones (phonic, inductor and hybrid). The switches were designed for 6, 10, 12, and 20 (when pairing) numbers and were used to service the internal telephone communications of the regiment, battalion, and division headquarters. By the way, the switches evolved quite quickly and by 1944 the army had light equipment with high capacity. The last switches were already stationary (about 80 kg) and could provide switching for up to 90 subscribers. 


Telephone switch K-10. Pay attention to the inscription on the body

In the fall of 1941, the Germans set themselves the goal of capturing Moscow. Among other things, the capital was the central hub of all Soviet communications, and this bundle of nerves needed to be destroyed. In the event of the destruction of the Moscow junction, all fronts would be divided, therefore, the People's Commissar of Communications I.T. Peresypkin in the vicinity of Moscow created a ring line of communication with important large nodes North, South, East, West. These backup nodes would provide communications even in the event of the complete destruction of the country's central telegraph. Ivan Terentyevich Peresypkin played a huge role in the war: he formed more than 1000 communications units, established courses and schools for telephone operators, radio operators, signalmen, who provided specialists to the front as soon as possible.By mid-1944, thanks to the decisions of the People’s Commissar of Communications Peresypkin, there was no "radio fear" on the fronts, and even before Lend-Lease, the troops were equipped with more than 64,000 different types of radio stations. At 39, Peresypkin became a communications marshal. 

Radio stations


The war was a period of incredible progress in radio communications. In general, the relations of the signal officers of the Red Army initially evolved with a stretch: if almost any soldier could handle a simple phone, then radio stations required signalmen with certain skills. Therefore, the first signalmen of the war preferred their loyal friends - field phones. However, radio stations soon showed what they were capable of and began to be used everywhere and gained particular popularity among partisans and intelligence units.


Wearable HF radio station (3-P) 

The RB radio station (battalion radio station) with a power of 0.5 W of the first modifications consisted of a transceiver (10.4 kg), power (14.5 kg) and dipole antenna laying (3.5 kg). The length of the dipole was 34 m, the antenna - 1.8 m. There was a cavalry version, which was mounted on a special frame to the saddle. It was one of the oldest radio stations that were used at the beginning of World War II.


The foreman of the Red Army and RB

By 1942, a version of the RBM (modernized) appeared, in which the number of types of electronic tubes used was reduced, and the strength and rigidity of the structure were increased, as required by real combat conditions. There were RBM-1 with an output power of 1 W and RBM-5 at 5 watts. Remote devices of the new stations made it possible to negotiate from points at a distance of up to 3 km. This station became a personal radio station for the commanders of divisions, corps and armies. When using the reflected beam, it was possible to maintain a stable radiotelegraph communication of 250 km or more (by the way, unlike medium waves that could be used effectively with the reflecting beam only at night, short waves up to 6 MHz were well reflected from the ionosphere at any time of the day and could propagate at a large distance due to reflections from the ionosphere and the surface of the earth,without requiring any powerful transmitters). In addition, the BSR proved to be excellent in servicing airfields in wartime. 

After the war, the army used more advanced models, and the BSR became popular with geologists and were used for so long that they still managed to become heroes of articles in specialized journals in the 80s.

BSR scheme:


In 1943, the Americans requested a license to produce this successful and reliable radio station, but they were refused.

The next hero of the war is the North radio station, which was compared to Katyusha at the front, this unit was so urgently needed and timely. 

Radio stations "North" began to be produced in 1941 and even produced in the besieged Leningrad. They were lighter than the first RB - the weight of a complete set with batteries was "only" 10 kg. She provided communications at a distance of 500 km, and in certain conditions and the hands of professionals "reached" up to 700 km. This radio station was intended primarily for intelligence and partisan units. It was a radio station with a direct amplification receiver, three-stage, with regenerative feedback. In addition to the battery version, there was a “lite” version, which however required AC power, as well as several separate versions for the fleet. The kit included an antenna, headphones, a telegraph key, a spare set of lamps, and a repair kit.To organize communications at the headquarters of the fronts, special radio nodes with powerful transmitters and sensitive radios were deployed. The communication centers had their own schedule, according to which they maintained radio communications 2-3 times a day. By 1944, radio stations of the North type connected the Central Headquarters with more than 1,000 partisan detachments. Sever supported sets of secret communications equipment (ZAC), but they were often refused so as not to receive a few more kilograms of equipment. To "keep secret" negotiations from the enemy, they spoke in a simple cipher, but according to a certain schedule, on different waves and with additional encoding of the location of the troops.By 1944, radio stations of the North type connected the Central Headquarters with more than 1,000 partisan detachments. Sever supported sets of secret communications equipment (ZAC), but they were often refused so as not to receive a few more kilograms of equipment. To "keep secret" negotiations from the enemy, they spoke in a simple cipher, but according to a certain schedule, on different waves and with additional encoding of the location of the troops.By 1944, radio stations of the North type connected the Central Headquarters with more than 1,000 partisan detachments. Sever supported sets of secret communications equipment (ZAC), but they were often refused so as not to receive a few more kilograms of equipment. To "keep secret" negotiations from the enemy, they spoke in a simple cipher, but according to a certain schedule, on different waves and with additional encoding of the location of the troops.  


Radio station North 

12-RP is a Soviet wearable short-wave infantry radio station used in regimental and artillery networks of the Red Army. Consists of separate 12-P transmitter units and 5SG-2 receiver. Transceiver, telephone and telegraph, half-duplex radio station, designed to work on the move and in parking lots. The radio station consisted of transceiver packages (weight 12 kg, dimensions 426 x 145 x 205 mm) and power (weight 13.1 kg, dimensions 310 x 245 x 185 mm). It was carried behind the back by belts by two fighters. The radio station was produced from October - November 1941 and until the end of World War II by the Gorky State Union Plant No. 326named after MV Frunze During the Great Patriotic War, the plant made a great contribution to providing troops with radio communications. At it, 48 front-line brigades were organized, in which more than 500 people worked. In 1943 alone, 2928 seven measuring instruments were produced. In the same year, Plant No. 326 gave the Army 7601 a 12-RP type radio station and 5839 12-RT type radio stations.


Radio station 12-RP

Radio stations quickly became indispensable in aviation, transport and especially in tanks. By the way, it was the buildup of tank troops and aviation that became the main prerequisite for the transition of Soviet army units to radio waves - a cordless telephone was unsuitable for connecting tanks and aircraft with each other and with command posts.

Soviet tank radio stations had a communication range much higher than German ones, and this was, perhaps, the advanced part of the military communications of the beginning and middle of the war. In the Red Army, the beginning of the war with communications was very bad - largely due to the same pre-war policy of non-arms development. The first terrible defeats and thousands of human casualties were largely due to the fragmentation of actions and the lack of means of communication.

The first Soviet tank radio station was the 71-TK, developed in the early 30s. During the Great Patriotic War, they were replaced by radio stations 9-P, 10-P and 12-P, which were continuously improved. Together with the radio station, tanks used TPU intercoms. Since tankers could not occupy their hands and be distracted, laryngophones and head phones (essentially headphones) were mounted on the helmets of tankers - hence the word “headset” came from. Information was transmitted using a microphone or a telegraph key. In 1942, tank radio stations 12-RT were produced on the basis of infantry radio stations 12-RP. Tank radio stations were intended primarily for the exchange of information between vehicles. So, the 12-RP provided two-way communication with an equivalent radio station in mid-terrain in the daytime at distances:

  • Ray (at a certain angle) - telephone up to 6 km, telegraph up to 12 km
  • Shtyr (flat terrain, a lot of interference) - telephone up to 8 km, telegraph up to 16 km
  • Dipole, inverted V (best suited for forests and ravines) - telephone up to 15 km, telegraph up to 30 km

The most successful and long-lived in the troops was the 10-RT, which replaced the 10-P in 1943, which had controls that were ergonomic at the time and mounted on the helmet.


10-RT inside


Tank radio station 10-P

Aircraft airborne radio stations of the KV range of the RSI began to be produced in 1942, installed on fighter jets and worked for negotiations at frequencies of 3.75-5 MHz. The range of such stations was up to 15 km for communication between aircraft and up to 100 km for communication with ground-based radio stations of control centers. The signal range depended on the quality of metallization and shielding of electrical equipment, the fighter's radio station required more careful tuning and a professional approach. By the end of the war, some RSI models allowed short-term boosting of the transmitter power to 10 watts. The radio controls were mounted on the pilot's helmet according to the same principles as in tanks.


RSI-3M1 - a short-wave transmitter that was included with the radio station of the RSI-4 fighter, was produced since 1942.

By the way, there were numerous cases when the radio station in the backpack saved the life of the signalman - she took over the bullets or splinters during the bombing, she herself broke down, and rescued the fighter. In general, during the war, many radio stations were created and used for infantry, navy, submarine fleet, aviation and special purposes, and each of them is worth a whole article (or even a book), because they were the same fighters as those who worked with them . But Habr is not enough for such a study.

Nevertheless, I will mention one more radio station - US radios (universal superheterodyne, that is, a local low-power high-frequency generator), a series of DV / CB / HF radio receivers. This USSR radio began to be created under the third rearmament program of the Red Army and played a huge role in coordinating and conducting hostilities. Initially, the mustache was designed to equip radio stations of bombers, but they quickly went into service with the ground forces and fell in love with signalmen for their compactness, ease of operation and exceptional reliability, comparable to a wired telephone. Nevertheless, the line of radio receivers turned out to be so successful that they not only “worked out” their needs for aviation and infantry,but later became popular with the radio fans of the USSR (who were looking for decommissioned copies for their experiments). 


CSS

Special Communication


Speaking of communications during the years of World War II, one cannot but mention special communications. The queen of technology was the government “HF communications” (it’s ATS-1, aka Kremlin), originally developed for the OGPU, which was impossible to listen to without complex technical devices and special access to lines and equipment. It was a system of secure communication channels ... However, why was it? It still exists: a system of secure communication channels that ensures stable connection and confidentiality of negotiations between the country's leaders, important defense enterprises, ministries and law enforcement agencies. Today the means of protection have changed and strengthened, but the goals and objectives remained the same: no one should know a single piece of information that passed through these channels.

In 1930, the first Moscow automatic telephone exchange was launched (it replaced the group of manual communication switches), which ceased operation only in 1998. By mid-1941, the government high-frequency communications network consisted of 116 stations, 20 facilities, 40 broadcasting centers and served about 600 subscribers. Not only the Kremlin was equipped with high-frequency communications, but for the management of hostilities it was equipped with headquarters and command at the forefront. By the way, during the war years, the Moscow HF station was moved to the working rooms of the Kirovskaya metro station (Chistye Prudy since November 1990) to protect it from possible bombardments of the capital. 

As you probably already understood from the abbreviation HF, the principle of high-frequency telephony was based on the work of government communications back in the 30s. The human voice was transferred to higher frequencies and became inaccessible to direct listening. In addition, this technology made it possible to transfer several negotiations on the same wire at once, which potentially should have become an additional obstacle to interception. 

The human voice produces air vibrations in the frequency range 300-3200 Hz, and a regular telephone line for its transmission must have a dedicated band (where sound vibrations will be converted to electromagnetic) up to 4 kHz. Accordingly, to listen to such a signal transmission, it is enough to “steal” to the wire in any way possible. And if you let a high frequency band of 10 kHz run along the wire, you get a carrier signal and the voice vibrations of subscribers can be masked in changes in the signal characteristics (frequency, phase and amplitude). These changes in the carrier signal form an envelope signal that will transmit the sound of the voice to the other end. If at the time of such a conversation you connect directly to the wire with a simple device, you can only hear the RF signal.  


Preparations for the Berlin operation, on the left is Marshal G.K. Zhukov, in the center is one of the indispensable fighters, the phone

Marshal of the Soviet Union I.S. Konev wrote about HF communications in his memoirs: “I must say that this HF connection, as they say , was sent to us by God. She helped us out so much, she was so stable in the most difficult conditions, that we must pay tribute to our technicians and our signalmen, who specially provided this connection to the HF and in any situation literally on his heels accompanied by movement all those who should use this connection. ”


Outside of our brief review, such important communication tools as the telegraph and reconnaissance equipment, encryption issues in wartime, and the history of interception of negotiations have remained. Outside of that were the communication devices of allies and opponents - and this is a whole interesting world of confrontation. But here, as we have already said, Habré is not enough to write about everything, with documentaries, facts and scans of instructions and books of that time. This is not just some point, it is a huge independent layer of Russian history. If you are as interested as we are, then I will leave some very cool links to resources that you can explore. And believe me, there is something to discover and something to be surprised.


Today in the world there is any connection: super secure wired, satellite communications, numerous instant messengers, dedicated radio frequencies, mobile communications, walkie-talkies of all models and protection classes. Most of the means of communication are extremely vulnerable to any military operations and sabotage. And in the end, the most durable in the field, as then, will surely be a wired telephone. I just don’t feel like checking it, and I don’t need to. We better use all this for peaceful purposes.

Happy Radio and Communication Day, dear friends, signalmen and involved! Your RegionSoft

73!

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